INTRODUCTION
In content fingerprinting, the same media covertext-image, video, audio, or text-is distributed to many users. A fingerprint, a mark unique to each user, is embedded into each copy of the distributed covertext. In a collusion attack, two or more users may combine their copies in an attempt to "remove" their fingerprints and forge a pirated copy. To trace the forgery back to members of the coalition, we need fingerprinting codes that can reliably identify the fingerprints of those members. Researchers have been focusing on designing or testing fingerprints for Gaussian host signals and the mean square error (MSE) distortion under some classes of collusion attacks, in terms of the detector's error probability in detecting collusion members. For example, under the assumptions of Gaussian fingerprints and Gaussian attacks (the fingerprinted signals are averaged and then the result is passed through a Gaussian test channel), Moulin and Briassouli 1 derived optimal strategies in a game-theoretic framework that uses the detector's error probability as the performance measure for a binary decision problem (whether a user participates in the collusion attack or not); Stone 2 and Zhao et al. 3 studied average and other non-linear collusion attacks for Gaussian-like fingerprints; Wang et al. 4 stated that the average collusion attack is the most efficient one for orthogonal fingerprints; Kiyavash and Moulin 5 derived a mathematical proof of the optimality of the average collusion attack under some assumptions.
In this paper, we also consider Gaussian cover signals, the MSE distortion, and memoryless collusion attacks. We do not make any assumption about the fingerprinting codes used other than an embedding distortion constraint. Also, our only assumptions about the attack channel are an expected distortion constraint, a memoryless constraint, and a fairness constraint. That is, the colluders are allowed to use any arbitrary nonlinear strategy subject to the above constraints. Under those constraints on the fingerprint embedder and the colluders, fingerprinting capacity is obtained as the solution of a mutual-information game involving probability density functions (pdf's) designed by the embedder and the colluders. We show that the optimal fingerprinting strategy is a Gaussian test channel where the fingerprinted signal is the sum of an attenuated version of the cover signal plus a Gaussian information-bearing noise, and the optimal collusion strategy is to average fingerprinted signals possessed by all the colluders and pass the averaged copy through a Gaussian test channel. The capacity result and the optimal strategies are the same for both the private and public games. In the former scenario, the original covertext is available to the decoder, while in the latter setup, the original covertext is available to the encoder but not to the decoder.
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Both of the private and public fingerprinting setups are modelled in Fig. 1 . Let the covertext sequence S = (S 1 , . . . , S N ) consist of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) samples drawn from a Gaussian pdf N (0, σ 2 ). The fingerprinting encoder generates |M| = 2 NR fingerprinted copies
N is the fingerprinting code and R is its rate. Each fingerprint m corresponds to a user. Assume that the collusion size is L = 2.
* Let M 1 and M 2 be two users selected independently and uniformly from the set M. They collude to produce a pirated copy, or forgery, Y ∈ R N , through an attack channel p Y|X1X2 . The decoder does not know p Y|X1X2 selected by the two colluders. The decoder produces estimates
2 in attempt to catch the two colluders. 
Notation
We use uppercase letters for random variables, lowercase letters for their individual values, and boldface fonts for sequences (or vectors). Differential entropy of a random variable X is denoted by h(X), and the mutual information between two random variables X and Y is denoted by I(X; Y ). The mathematical expectation is denoted by E.
Constrained Fingerprint Codes and Collusion Attack Channels
The MSE distortion between a fingerprinted signal sequence x and a covertext signal sequence s is defined as
Fingerprinting codes are required to satisfy
where 
We denote by Q 1 the set of such feasible covert private fingerprinting channels.
Definition 2.2. Given an auxiliary random variable U ∈ R, a covert public fingerprinting channel is a conditional pdf
We denote by Q 2 the set of such feasible covert public fingerprinting channels.
We define a constrained discrete memoryless collusion channel (DMCC) as a pdf p Y |X1X2 subject to a fairness constraint
and the expected MSE distortion constraint
We pose the fairness constraint and the D 2 constraint on both colluders, based on the assumption that neither colluder is willing to take more risks than the other colluder. If this assumption does not hold, then any attempt to catch all colluders is futile because one colluder can make negligible or even zero contribution to the pirated copy Y.
Definition 2.3. A discrete memoryless collusion attack channel is a conditional pdf p
We denote A the set of all such feasible DMMCs.
Probability of Error and Capacity
In this paper, we only consider the case of detecting at least one colluder. An error occurs when the decoded two fingerprints do not match the fingerprints of the real colluders:
The average probability of error for a deterministic code (
The minmax probability of error for the class of constrained DMCCs considered is given by 
Known Results on Capacity Formulas
Somekh-Baruch and Merhav 6, 7 derived capacity and error exponent formulas for private fingerprinting, and Wang and Moulin 8 derived capacity and error exponent formulas for public fingerprinting. These results [6] [7] [8] were derived for the case that the cover, fingerprinted, and forgery signals are from finite alphabets. But the results can be extended to the case of continuous alphabets. We use the following known formulas and derive the capacity for the case of a Gaussian cover signal and the MSE distortion. Capacity is infinite if the feasible set of attacks A is empty.
Theorem 2.6. 6 The capacity of the private fingerprinting game is given by
where
That is, the joint pdf of (S,
Theorem 2.7. 8 The capacity of the public fingerprinting game is given by
where U 1 ∈ R and U 2 ∈ R are auxiliary random variables,
MAIN RESULTS
Theorem 3.1. For a Gaussian cover signal S ∼ N (0, σ 2 ), the private Gaussian fingerprinting game capacity (8) is determined as follows:
Denote the maximizingã of (10) by a. The maxmin in (8) is achieved by the following fingerprinting channel:
are independent of S; the optimal collusion attack channel is
, the public Gaussian fingerprinting game capacity derived from (9) is the same as the private game capacity:
2 , the optimal fingerprinting channel is
and
are independent of S, a is the maximizer of (10),
the optimal collusion attack channel is
Remark 1: For the Gaussian cover signal S and the MSE distortion, the achievable rate of reliable transmission (the decoder correctly decodes at least one colluder's fingerprint) is the same whether or not the cover signal is available to the decoder ! The same observation has been made for the watermarking case,
9 which is a single-user version of the fingerprinting game.
Remark 2:
In the small distortion case, σ
Remark 3:
Capacity is infinite if D 2 < 1 2 D 1 because the feasible set A is empty in that case.
SKETCH OF THE PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1
The maximal value of EX 2 over all feasible p X|S is ( √ D 1 + σ) 2 and achieved by X = aS when a = 1+ D1 σ 2 . The colluders can simply let Y = 0 if D 2 ≥ EX 2 , and the value of the cost function of (8) is 0. Thus, the capacity
The rest of Theorem 3.1, i.e. when 2 , is proved by showing that the capacity C P riv is lower bounded and at the same time upper bounded by the value given in the theorem.
Proof of the Direct Part: Lower Bound of C P riv
We obtain a lower bound on C P riv by fixing a (not necessarily optimal) covert private fingerprinting channel and looking for the minimizing collusion attack channel for this specific fingerprinting channel.
Suppose that X 1 = aS + Z 1 and X 2 = aS + Z 2 , where the cover signal S and fingerprints 
Only when
the variance σ 2 Z is greater than 0 and fingerprints are nonzero.
Thus,
and the assumed covert private fingerprinting channel is feasible.
We have
In order for EX 2 ≥ 0, i.e. X 1,2 ≡ 0, it is required that
for x ≥ 0, the interval given by (12) suffices to specify the meaningful values of a and (16) does not impose an additional constraint.
From the fairness condition
and a feasible DMCC needs to satisfy
Let us denote σ
We substitute all the above-defined random variables to the cost function of (8):
where (a) follows from the fact that Y = bV is a deterministic function of V ; (b) is valid because the mutual information is conditioned on S; (c) follows from the facts that Z 1 and Z 2 are independent of S and conditioning decreases the entropy; (d) is obtained because a Gaussian independent noise W * ∼ N (0, σ 2 W ) minimizes the mutual information when the noise power is fixed at σ 2 W .
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We substitute (11) and (18) into (19). Given a, the colluders search for the optimal b and σ 2 W to minimize the lower bound on J. Calculation shows that the optimal b is
and the optimal σ
Then we seek a that minimizes (21) and therefore maximizes (19). Finally, the capacity C P riv is lower-bounded by
Note that if
, the set of feasible DMCCs is empty and hence the capacity is infinite.
Proof of the Converse Part: C P riv ≤ C G
We now only need to consider
We obtain an upper bound on C P riv by fixing a (not necessarily optimal) collusion attack channel and looking for the maximizing fingerprinting channel for this specific collusion channel.
Let the collusion attack channel be
is independent of X 1 and X 2 , and b and σ 2 W will be optimized subject to the distortion constraints:
Let Z 1 = X 1 − aS and Z 2 = X 2 − aS, where Z 1 and Z 2 have the same pdf since p X|S = p X1|S = p X2|S , and a is a parameter to be optimized. We denote σ
Substituting all the above-defined random variables to the cost function of (8), we have
where ( 
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Simple calculation shows that since 
2 σ 2 as in (11), the optimal a is the maximizer for (22), and finally, C P riv is upper-bounded by C G shown in (22).
SKETCH OF THE PROOF OF THEOREM 3.2
Since for the public Gaussian fingerprinting game, the cover signal S is not available to the decoder, it follows naturally that C P ub ≤ C P riv . We just need to prove that
Again, we obtain the lower bound by fixing a (not necessarily optimal) fingerprinting channel and looking for the minimizing collusion attack channel for this specific fingerprinting channel.
are independent, and a, α, and σ 2 Z are to be optimized subject to
Similarly to the steps we take in Section 4.1, we let
We substitute all the above-defined random variables to the cost function of (9) where K X denotes the covariance matrix for the Gaussian random vector X.
The encoder can maximize the right-hand side of (29), the lower bound on J, by selecting α to be
The right-hand side of (30) is the same as the one in (19) for the private fingerprinting case. Consequently, the encoder/decoder applies the same set of optimal parameters as in the private game to maximize the right-hand side of (30), and the colluders do the same to minimize it. Finally, the capacity C P ub is lower bounded by C G defined in (22). Therefore, C P ub = C P riv .
